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1 The remaining "nonfundamental" variation in security prices remains the subject of intense debate. Efficient market aficionados attribute it to time-varying risk. Value investors attribute it to irrational "animal spirits." But neither camp has made much progress in elucidating its respective explanation. As such, much of the variation in observed security prices remains poorly understood.
Our objective in this article is to establish the importance of investor recognition in explaining variation in stock prices. We are not the first to investigate the role of investor recognition in security valuation. Merton (1987) modified the traditional capital asset pricing model to incorporate investor recognition. Empirical research by Lehavy and Sloan (2008) and Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) provided preliminary evidence consistent with Merton's predictions. 2 We synthesized and extended this research, applying it to a broad cross section of U.S. stocks. Our results highlight the importance of investor recognition in explaining variation in stock prices, expected returns, investing activities, and financing activities.
Our research is incremental to existing research in three significant respects. First, we developed a parsimonious and effective measure of the level of investor recognition using commercially available U.S. data. Second, we decomposed stock returns into components attributable to expected returns, fundamental news, and nonfundamental news and directly tested whether investor recognition has the predicted association with each component. Third, we examined the relative importance of investor recognition in driving stock returns over varying investment horizons, demonstrating that investor recognition dominates over short horizons (e.g., one quarter) and fundamentals dominate over longer horizons (e.g., five years).
Investor Recognition and Stock Prices
The theoretical linkage between investor recognition and stock returns was developed in Merton (1987) . Merton modified standard asset pricing theory by introducing the additional assumption that not all investors know about all securities. Some securities are known to many investors, whereas others are known to relatively few investors. This assumption is consistent with observed investor behavior and can be motivated on both rational and irrational grounds. From a rational perspective, index investors restrict themselves to securities that belong to predefined indices and active institutional investors often restrict themselves to predefined investment universes. Such behavior can be rationalized by information-processing costs and agency costs. From an irrational perspective, behavioral finance research documents that investors are more likely to hold "attention-grabbing"
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A What Makes Stock Prices Move? Fundamentals vs. Investor Recognition
stocks, such as those of companies that currently have popular products and services (e.g., Barber and Odean 2008) . For example, at the time of writing (early 2011), Apple and Pandora Media, Inc., were two stocks with popular products and services that were relatively widely held by investors.
In standard asset pricing models, such as the capital asset pricing model, all investors hold all securities and expected returns (prices) are increasing (decreasing) in the sensitivity of the securities to common factor risk. This equilibrium arises because common factor risk is the only source of risk that must be borne by investors and, hence, the only source of risk that is priced. Introducing the assumption that not all investors know about all securities makes the standard equilibrium unattainable. Instead, securities that are known to relatively few investors must trade at relatively lower prices in order for markets to clear. Intuitively, investors who do know about the "neglected" securities require an expected return premium to compensate for the idiosyncratic risk associated with holding relatively undiversified positions in these securities. Thus, neglected securities will trade at lower prices and offer higher expected returns than their well-recognized counterparts, and this effect will be particularly pronounced for securities with high idiosyncratic risk. Merton's analysis, therefore, leads to the following key predictions: 1. Security prices are increasing in investor recognition. 2. Expected returns are decreasing in investor recognition. 3. These two relationships are stronger for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk. Note that Prediction 1 implies that a security experiencing increasing investor recognition will experience contemporaneously positive stock returns because an increase in investor recognition causes the security's expected return to fall and, therefore, its price to rise. It is also important to point out that these predictions all assume that the aggregate size of a security issue is held constant. Thus, we need to control for issue size in our empirical tests, and we describe how we did this in the next section. Merton (1987) also extended his analysis to explore the impact of investor recognition on the underlying companies that issue the securities. This analysis led to the prediction that companies are more likely to issue new securities and make new investments when investor recognition is relatively high. Higher investor recognition leads to lower expected stock returns, which, in turn, translates to a lower cost of capital for the underlying companies. A lower cost of capital will make investments that were previously marginal become more attractive, hence increasing investing and financing activities. This extension leads to two additional predictions: 4. New security issuances are increasing in investor recognition. 5. New investments are increasing in investor recognition.
Research Design
Our research design relies on two new constructs. The first is our measure of size-adjusted investor recognition. The second is our decomposition of realized returns into fundamental and nonfundamental components. We begin by describing these two constructs and then summarize other features of our research design.
Measuring Investor Recognition.
We sought a parsimonious measure of investor recognition that captures the spirit of Merton's theoretical construct. The number of investors who know about a security is theoretically valid only when investors have equal amounts of capital to invest. Investors who have more capital than other investors afford more recognition. Therefore, we followed Lehavy and Sloan (2008) by restricting our sample to institutional investors with more than $100 million in holdings, who are required to file their quarter-end holdings information with the SEC on Form 13F. We measured breadth of ownership, BREADTH i,t , as the ratio of the number of institutions holding the common stock of company i at time t as captured by 13F filings, , relative to the total number of institutions holding common stock in any company at time t as captured by 13F filings, :
We controlled for issue size by placing observations into size-ranked deciles at each time t and computing the mean value of BREADTH i,t within each size-ranked decile. We used the total assets of the company as our measure of size. We used total assets instead of market capitalization because we did not want the measure of investor recognition to be mechanically related to the price of the security. We used total assets instead of book value of common equity because the latter is more sensitive to accounting distortions (e.g., negative book values for companies with accumulated losses).
We measured INV_REC i,t on an annual basis with a three-month lag to the fiscal year-end. For example, as shown in the time line in Figure 1 , for a company with a 31 December 2000 fiscal yearend, we measured INV_REC i,t as of 31 March 2001. The three-month lag allows for the release of financial information from the previous fiscal year. Because we also measured stock price and analyst forecasts of earnings as of this date, we are sure that all these variables reflect information in the previous year's financial statements.
Decomposing Realized Stock Returns. Our empirical tests required us to decompose realized stock returns into (1) expected returns, (2) unexpected returns related to new information about future cash distributions (often referred to as "fundamental news" or "cash flow news"), and (3) unexpected returns that are unrelated to information about fundamentals (often referred to as "expected return news" or "discount rate news"). We did this by using the return decomposition framework of Chee, Sloan, and Uysal (2011) . 4 The starting point is the standard dividend discount valuation model:
(1) where P i,t = the price of security i at time t r i,t = the discount rate for security i at time t E t (d i,t+ ) = the expected net cash distribution for security i at time t +  T = the number of periods until the security makes its final liquidating distribution We then introduced the standard clean surplus accounting relationship, which states that accounting book values, BV, articulate via accounting earnings, X, and net cash distributions, d:
With these assumptions, Ohlson (1995, p. 674) demonstrated that for large values of T, company value can be approximated in terms of expectations of cum-dividend earnings over the life of the company as follows: 5 (3)
Intuitively, this expression says that a security's value can be approximated by capitalizing its expected long-run earnings power. 6 Chee et al. (2011) recommended using Equation 3 to estimate the expected return on a security i at time t, r i,t , by setting T equal to 2, measuring the numerator by summing analysts' consensus analyst forecast of earnings over the next two years, and setting P i,t equal to the observed market price at time t:
Intuitively, Equation 4 approximates a security's expected return using the annualized two-year forward earnings yield. 8 Note that the use of the forward earnings yield as an expected return proxy is well established in the literature (e.g., Lee, So, and Wang 2010) . We used Equation 4 to Fundamental news is equal to the percentage change in expected future earnings over the period plus the realized dividend yield less the expected security return at the beginning of the period. Intuitively, this construct corresponds to the unexpected change in the security's future earnings power over the period. 9 We have now identified the two components of the realized return for period t + 1 that are related to fundamentals (r i,t and F i,t+1 ), leaving a third component that picks up any remaining price movements that are unexplained by fundamentals. We used this decomposition to answer two questions: 1. How much of the variation in stock prices remains unexplained by fundamentals? 2. To what extent can variation in stock prices that is unexplained by fundamentals be explained by changes in investor recognition?
Other Research Design Choices. Our remaining research design choices are summarized by reference to Figure 1 . For a company with a 31 December 2000 fiscal year-end, we measured earnings expectations, price, and investor recognition as of 31 March 2001. Doing so allowed earnings for the year 2000 to be reported to investors and thus reflected in earnings expectations and prices. Recall that expected return, r i,2000 , is equal to the result of summing the consensus analyst earnings forecasts for the years 2001 and 2002, dividing by P i,2000 , and then annualizing the resulting yield. We restricted our sample to cases where the estimated expected return was positive and, hence, economically meaningful. 10 We computed the realized security return and fundamental news for 2001 over the year beginning 1 April 2001 and ending 31 March 2002. We computed realized security returns using standard buy-and-hold cum-dividend returns.
We conducted our stock return decomposition by estimating annual cross-sectional regressions of total returns, R i,t+1 , on beginning-of-period expected returns, r i,t , and contemporaneous fundamental news, F i,t+1 , as follows:
The residual from this annual regression,  i,t+1 , is our estimate of price variation that is not explained by fundamentals (i.e., expected return news). We predict that  i, t+1 is positively related to changes in investor recognition.
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the following publicly available data sources. First, we acquired data for one-and two-year-ahead consensus earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. Second, we acquired stock return data from CRSP. 
Results
In this section, we discuss the results concerning our annual return decomposition and investor recognition tests.
Annual Return Decomposition Results. Table 1 reports annual cross-sectional regression results from estimating the return decomposition in Equation 6. The average explanatory power of these regressions across all 23 years of data is 38 percent, indicating that fundamentals explain just over onethird of the annual variation in stock returns.
11 Note that both expected return, r i,t , and fundamental news, F i,t+1 , have the hypothesized positive coefficients in all periods. From a theoretical perspective, these coefficients should equal 1. There are at least three reasons why this does not hold in practice. First, our valuation model is only an approximation. Second, measuring investors' expectations by using analysts' earnings forecasts introduces errors into our regressions. Third, our regressions do not include contemporaneous changes in expected returns as an explanatory variable. Previous research has suggested that expected returns are mean reverting, inducing a negative correlation between expected returns and subsequent changes in expected returns (see DeBondt and Thaler 1989) . Thus, the estimated coefficients on r i,t will pick up both the realization of expected returns and changes
, .
Financial Analysts Journal in expected returns, with the latter effect causing the coefficients to be greater than 1. The results suggest that mean reversion in expected returns was particularly pronounced during 2000 and 2001, reflecting the bursting of the dot-com bubble.
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Figure 2 illustrates our return decomposition graphically. Panel A plots total return variance, and Panel B plots relative return variance. The figure again illustrates that fundamentals, as reflected in expected returns and fundamental news, typically explain less than half the variation in security returns. Note the spike in return variance in 1999 that is not explained by fundamentals. This year marked the height of the dot-com bubble, when many commentators observed that stock prices seemed to be driven by "irrational exuberance" (e.g., Shiller 2000) . It seems possible that intense investor recognition of internet-related stocks was instrumental in driving the dot-com bubble.
Investor Recognition Results. We now turn to tests of our primary predictions concerning investor recognition. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for our key variables. The correlation matrix in Panel B provides preliminary evidence consistent with our first two predictions. First, realized returns are highly positively correlated with changes in investor recognition. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between R i,t+1 and INV_REC i,t+1 is 0.39 (0.48), which is consistent with our first prediction-that price is increasing in investor recognition. The positive correlation between R i,t+1 and INV_REC i,t+1 is driven by both the F i,t+1 and  i,t+1 components of R i,t+1 . The correlation with F i,t+1 indicates that investors are attracted to securities with improving fundamentals. The correlation with  i,t+1 is consistent with the existence of other, nonfundamental determinants of investor recognition that also influence prices.
The correlations also confirm our second prediction-a negative relationship between investor recognition and expected returns. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between r i,t and INV_REC i,t is -0.28 (-0.35). The negative relationship is also evident (albeit more weakly) in the correlation between investor recognition and realized future returns, which is -0.02 (-0.04); the weakness of this result is not surprising because the correlation between expected returns and realized returns is quite low, with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.08 (0.13). These simple correlations provide preliminary evidence consistent with our first two predictions. The correlations also highlight an important limitation of our return decomposition. Fundamental news should be unpredictable if it is correctly measured. However, the correlations between r i,t and F i,t+1 are significantly negative. This result is attributable to the fact that the consensus analyst forecasts that we used as earnings expectations are known to reflect the expectations embedded in stock prices with a lag (see, e.g., Hughes, Liu, and Su 2008) . For example, if bad fundamental news arrives during period t but is not incorporated in analysts' consensus forecasts until period t + 1, our analyst-forecast-based estimate of r i,t will be too high and our analystforecast-based estimate of F i,t+1 will be too low, resulting in the spurious negative correlation between the two. Consequently, it is important to keep this limitation of our return decomposition in mind when interpreting our subsequent results. We estimated regression Equation 6 in each fiscal year for this variance decomposition. var .
var .
■ Realized security returns and changes in investor recognition. Our first prediction is that security prices are increasing in investor recognition. We tested this prediction by looking at the relationship between realized security returns and changes in investor recognition. If an increase in investor recognition leads to an increase in security prices, then we should observe a positive relationship between changes in investor recognition and security returns.
We have already seen from Panel B of Table 2 that R i,t+1 and INV_REC i,t+1 are strongly positively correlated. Figure 3 and Table 3 plot realized annual stock returns for two equal-weighted portfolios of securities representing the extreme deciles of the change in investor recognition in event Year 0. The highest decile represents companies with the biggest increases in investor recognition in Year 0. The plot shows that this portfolio had annual stock returns of 67 percent in Year 0. Meanwhile, companies in the lowest portfolio had returns of only -17 percent. Thus, the spread in annual returns between stocks that became less recognized and stocks that became more recognized is -84 percentage points (pps). Investor recognition clearly has an economically significant impact on security returns.
Recall that the impact of investor recognition on security prices is predicted to be greater for companies with higher idiosyncratic risk. To test this prediction, Figure 4 and Table 4 divide each of the portfolios used in Figure 3 and Table 3 into two equal-size subportfolios on the basis of idiosyncratic risk. We measured idiosyncratic risk (idvol) as the standard deviation of the residuals from regressions of daily stock returns on valueweighted market returns over the 12 months prior to the portfolio formation date. Figure 4 and Table  4 clearly demonstrate that the impact of investor recognition on security returns is magnified in the subportfolios with higher idiosyncratic risk. The Year 0 annual return spread is only -51 pps for the low-idvol portfolios, versus -117 pps for the highidvol portfolios.
The correlations in Table 2 indicate that changes in investor recognition are positively correlated with fundamental news. Hence, a potential limitation of the plots in Figures 3 and 4 and Tables 3 and 4 is that some of the observed variation in portfolio returns may have been driven by fundamental news rather than changes in investor recognition. We addressed this issue by simultaneously regressing realized stock returns on fundamentals and changes in investor recognition, as shown in Table 5 . We estimated separate regressions for each fiscal year in our sample, and we report the means and t-statistics for the coefficients. Our fundamental 
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Financial Analysts Journal with the predicted positive signs, and the average explanatory power is 32 percent. Fundamentals and investor recognition can each independently explain around one-third of the variation in stock returns. The final regression includes both the fundamental and investor recognition variables. All the variables continue to load with the predicted signs, and the average explanatory power climbs to 47 percent. Thus, although we cannot perfectly disentangle the impact of fundamentals and investor recognition on security returns, it is clear that both have economically and statistically significant incremental explanatory power. Note that a potential limitation of these results is that we have already established that our analyst-forecast-based estimate of F i,t+1 reflects market expectations with a lag. Therefore, it is possible that INV_REC i,t+1 captures fundamental news that is not yet reflected in F i,t+1 . To rule out this possibility, we replicated the results in Table  5 after adding realizations of F and INV_REC for year t + 2. The incremental significance and explanatory power of investor recognition are similar in year t + 1 after adding these additional control variables. Thus, we conclude that changes in both investor recognition and fundamentals have significant incremental explanatory power with respect to observed stock returns. ■ Expected returns and the level of investor recognition. Our second prediction is that expected returns are decreasing in investor recognition. The strong negative correlations between r i,t and INV_REC i,t in Panel B of Table 2 provide evidence consistent with this prediction. Intuitively, this result indicates that securities that are held by many (few) investors are priced to offer lower (higher) forward earnings yields. Figure 5 and Table 6 illustrate the economic significance of this result. The figure and the table report the average expected returns for extreme-decile portfolios formed on the basis of the level of investor recognition in event Year 0. In Year 0, the expected return on the lowinvestor-recognition portfolio was 9.20 percent but the expected return on the high-investor-recognition portfolio was only 6.27 percent. The lack of investor interest in the low-investor-recognition portfolio results in its being priced to yield 2.93 pps more than the high-investor-recognition portfolio.
Recall that we also predicted a stronger relationship between expected returns and investor recognition for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk. Figure 6 and Table 7 break down each of the extreme-investor-recognition portfolios Table 2 , investor recognition itself is a persistent characteristic.
Figures 5 and 6 and Tables 6 and 7 use the twoyear-ahead forward earnings yield to measure expected returns. Because expected returns should, on average, be reflected in realized returns, these results should also manifest themselves in average realized future returns. However, we expect the statistical significance of the results to be much weaker when using realized returns because of the confounding impact of news arriving during the period. Figure 7 and Table 8 plot average realized returns for extreme-decile portfolios formed on the basis of the level of investor recognition in event Year 0. Because the portfolios are formed at the end of Year 0, the predicted positive relationship between expected returns and investor recognition should manifest itself starting in Year 1. This is, indeed, the case. In Years 1-3, the spreads between the realized returns on the low-investor-recognition and high-investor-recognition portfolios are 4.14, 1.97, and 2.51 pps, respectively. Recall that the Year 0 expected return differential in Figure 5 and Table 6 is around 3 pps, which matches up well 
Financial Analysts Journal with the subsequently realized return differentials in Figure 7 and Table 8 . But the statistical significance of the return differentials is much weaker for realized returns. In the years leading up to Year 1, the pattern is different in that we observed a higher realized return for the high-investor-recognition portfolios. This result arises because we selected the portfolios on the basis of investor recognition in Year 0 and investors tend to recognize companies that have been performing well in the recent past. 14 Figure 8 and Table 9 investigate whether the spread in average subsequent realized returns is greater for the subportfolios of extreme investor recognition with high idiosyncratic risk. For Year 1, the answer is yes; the spread is 2.60 pps for the low-risk portfolio and 5.67 pps for the high-risk portfolio. Thereafter, the return spreads converge. But the tests in Figure 8 and Table 9 generally lack statistical significance.
■ Investing and financing activities and changes in investor recognition. The final two predictions are that security issuances and new investments are increasing in investor recognition. Recall that these predictions are based on the expectation that companies will exploit the lower costs of new capital associated with higher investor recognition by raising new capital and making new investments. We tested these predictions by looking for a positive relationship between security issuances/ investments and changes in investor recognition. We measured new net security issuances as the annual net cash flows from financing activities (reported in the statement of cash flows) deflated by average total assets. We measured investing 
Financial Analysts Journal activities as the annual net cash flows used for investing activities (also reported in the statement of cash flows) deflated by average total assets. Figure 9 and Table 10 plot average cash flows from financing for extreme-decile portfolios formed on the basis of changes in investor recognition in Year 0. As predicted, the high-decile portfolio raised more cash flows from financing than the low-decile portfolio, and the spread is highest in Years 0 and 1. The spreads are economically and statistically significant, peaking at -4.48 pps of assets in Year 1. Figure 10 and Table 11 contain a similar plot for cash used in investing activities. We again see a large spread between the high change in investor recognition portfolio and the low change in investor recognition portfolio. In the case of investing, the spread peaks in Years 1 and 2. This delayed response likely reflects the fact that investing activities tend to track financing activities with a lag. Highly recognized companies first raise new capital and then gradually invest the capital over the next year or so.
In unreported analysis, we also found that the observed spreads in financing and investing activities are more extreme for subportfolios with greater idiosyncratic risk. We omit the plots for brevity. The key inference from Figures 9 and 10 and Tables 10 and 11 is that companies' real investing and financing decisions are responsive to changes in investor recognition. ■ The relative importance of fundamentals and investor recognition over different investment horizons. Our analysis thus far focused exclusively on annual investment horizons. The autocorrelations in Panel C of Table 2 indicate that expected returns are slowly mean reverting and that price variation that is not explained by fundamentals,  i,t+1 , is negatively serially correlated. These autocorrelations suggest that investor recognition may be a relatively more important determinant of stock returns over shorter investment horizons and that fundamentals should dominate over longer horizons. Intuitively, changes in investor recognition introduce transitory changes in prices that cancel out over longer investment horizons. Thus, the importance of changes in investor recognition as a determinant of security returns should be mitigated over longer investment horizons. We investigated the relative importance of fundamentals and investor recognition over different investment horizons in Table 12 . This table basically replicates the regression analysis in Table  5 using quarterly measurement intervals in Panel A and five-year measurement intervals in Panel B. The results in Panel A clearly show that investor recognition explains relatively more of the variation in stock returns over quarterly investment horizons. Fundamentals explain only 8.64 percent of the variation in quarterly stock returns, whereas investor recognition explains 17.51 percent. In contrast, Panel B clearly shows that fundamentals explain relatively more of the variation in returns over five-year investment horizons. Fundamentals explain 56.58 percent of the variation in five-year returns, whereas investor recognition explains only 37.92 percent. In other words, investor recognition is a relatively more important determinant of stock returns over short horizons and fundamentals dominate stock returns over longer horizons.
It is also worth noting that the combined explanatory power of fundamentals and investor recognition is much lower over quarterly horizons (22.29 percent) than over five-year horizons (61.72 percent). This result suggests other transitory elements in short-horizon stock returns. These elements likely include transitory shifts in investor recognition that are not captured by our measure (e.g., recognition from retail investors) and other sources of "noise" in stock returns (e.g., temporary liquidity shocks).
Conclusion
We showed that investor recognition is an important determinant of security prices. Using a crude measure of investor recognition, we obtained results indicating that investor recognition is of the same order of importance as fundamentals in explaining annual stock returns. Our results also show that investor recognition is an important determinant of resource allocation in market economies. These results vindicate the significant resources that corporations allocate to investor relations and investment banking activities in order to promote their security offerings. To the extent that such activities are successful in increasing investor recognition, they should result in higher stock prices and lower costs of capital.
Our research is related to a parallel line of research on the role of investor sentiment in the stock market (see Baker and Wurgler 2007) . That research demonstrates that stock prices are affected by waves of investor sentiment, with certain stocks being more affected by sentiment than others. It seems likely that investor sentiment is an important determinant of investor recognition. For example, the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s was characterized by a broad wave of investor sentiment that was concentrated in stocks that were expected to benefit from the growth of the internet. At the same time, investor recognition has other likely determinants, including index membership, exchange listing, and analyst coverage. Subsequent research could investigate the extent to which variation in investor recognition can be explained by such determinants. Finally, our results have important implications for security analysis. The results suggest that in predicting stock price movements over short investment horizons, the analysis and forecasting of investor recognition is at least as important as the analysis and forecasting of fundamentals. Our results, therefore, provide a rationale for the existence of "growth" investors, who select securities with a primary focus on product innovation and growth potential and a secondary focus on price. To the extent that such investors are able to identify securities that will experience increases in investor recognition, they should generate superior investment performance.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
R i,t is the cumulative stock return over the 12 months ending at the end of the third month after fiscal year t. Size-adjusted returns, when used, are computed as the simple difference between the cumulative stock return and the corresponding average cumulative return for all stocks in the same size decile as provided by CRSP (computed using NYSE market capitalization breakpoints as of the start of the return cumulation period). r i,t is the expected return at the end of the third month after the end of fiscal year t, computed as where E t (X i,t+ ) is the expected earnings for company i in period t +  using analysts' -year-ahead consensus EPS forecasts issued at the end of the third month after the end of fiscal year t and P i,t is the price of the stock at the end of the third month after the end of fiscal year t. idvol i,t is idiosyncratic volatility for security i at time t, which is estimated as the standard deviation of the market model regression residuals using daily returns over the 12 months ending at time t.
Rank_idvol i,t is the normalized rank of idvol i,t . We ranked companies into deciles for each period on the basis of idvol i,t and then normalized the decile ranks to range from -0.5 to 0.5.
Notes
1. See, for example, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) . 2. Lehavy and Sloan's analysis (2008) most closely resembles ours, but their analysis was restricted to changes in investor recognition and they did not decompose stock returns into fundamental and nonfundamental components. Bodnaruk and Ostberg's analysis (2009) was limited to the level of investor recognition and future realized returns using a unique Swedish dataset. 3. We used an adjustment based on size-ranked deciles because the relationship between BREADTH i,t and issue size is highly nonlinear. 4. There are a number of alternative approaches for implementing company-level return decompositions. The earliest approach is attributable to Vuolteenaho (2002) and uses a variant of the vector autoregressive (VAR) decomposition methodology introduced by Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991) . Subsequent research by Chen and Zhao (2009, 2010) showed that the VAR approach produces particularly noisy and unstable estimates and instead advocated methodologies using analysts' forecasts of future earnings in conjunction with structured valuation models. The return decomposition framework proposed by Chee, Sloan, and Uysal (2011) falls into this latter category. We chose the Chee et al. framework because the decomposition is particularly parsimonious and intuitive. 5. Cum-dividend earnings refer to the cumulative reported earnings plus the opportunity cost of earnings on dividends paid during the period. For example, in computing cumdividend earnings for a 10-year period, we would first sum earnings for the 10 years and then add the additional earnings that could have been generated by reinvesting any dividends paid during the period between the time of their payment and the end of the 10-year period. 6. Note that the idea that an equity security can be valued by capitalizing its anticipated earnings power can be traced back at least as far as Graham and Dodd (1934) . Equation 3 formalizes this idea.
7. This implementation of Equation 3 ignores the adjustment for earnings on dividends, but this adjustment is typically insignificant when using a two-year cumulation period. 8. Chee et al. (2011) also tried using longer-term analysts'
forecasts of earnings but showed that because these forecasts were relatively more biased and less accurate, they added additional error to the expected return estimates. 9. Note that because F i,t+1 represents unexpected information, it should have an expected value of zero at time t. The reason that expected return is subtracted from the growth in expected earnings is that some earnings growth is expected as a result of the earnings reinvestment. 10. This restriction ruled out observations where the summed consensus forecast of earnings over the next two years is negative, eliminating approximately 6 percent of the sample observations. 11. Prior research has also found that fundamentals explain around one-third of the variation in annual stock returns. See, for example, Liu and Thomas (2000) . 12. A simple example illustrates this point. Assume that a stock is temporarily priced to yield an expected return of only 5 percent in a setting where the long-run expected return is 10 percent. At some point in the future, the price will fall to set the expected return closer to 10 percent. The associated negative stock return causes the coefficient on r i,t to be greater than 1. 13. Note that these regression results correspond to those reported in the final row of Table 1 , but these results are limited to observations for which we also had data available to compute our investor recognition variables. 14. It is also apparent that both the low-and high-investorrecognition deciles have higher realized returns in the years leading up to Year 1. This result occurred for two reasons:
(1) We required the companies to have positive earnings forecasts in Year 0 for inclusion in the sample, and thus, a positive hindsight bias exists in the Year -3 through 0 realized returns; and (2) our sample period ends in 2008, so the impact of the financial crisis is reflected in only the later event years.
